INFOPRO

RESEARCH

Lebanon, Our Story – SAT-7

- Report of Findings –

Endline Quantitative Research

July 12, 2024

LEBANON, OUR STORY – REPORT OF FINDINGS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Examining the lives of youth across various regions and demographic factors, it is evident that their lives have been significantly affected by Lebanon's economic, political, and security crises. Their primary concern is existential, driven by the escalating security situation and potential conflict with Israel in South Lebanon.

In response to these challenges, youth have prioritized immediate necessities, focusing on economic stability, employment, education, and family creation/protection. They seek additional income as short-term opportunities seem limited.

Youth identify sectarian discrimination and political favoritism as major social and cultural barriers in their daily lives, blaming political leaders and parties for these issues, while also acknowledging the people's role in the current situation. They value family traditions and moral and religious values, striving to preserve them.

The youth envision an ideal Lebanon as a peaceful, just, and corruption-free country where social and economic justice prevails, and free speech and faith are respected. They believe raising social awareness and electing ethical leaders are crucial for achieving this vision.

Religious faith plays a significant role in their lives, and they respect the freedom of religious practice for others. They are open to different communities, particularly in terms of religion, though less so regarding nationalities due to the refugee situation. They hold a generally positive view and hope on mixing different communities within society, but are less positive about the integration of host and refugee communities.

The youth see equality, justice, security, economic improvement, dignified living through coexistence, increased patriotism, and love for Lebanon as key drivers for social unity. Despite interacting comfortably with people from different backgrounds, their comfort level decreases when interacting with those of different nationalities or political affiliations.

Many youths do not seek assistance for public issues, often relying on their parents in line with Lebanese culture. Those who do seek help prefer authority figures within their own group, believing they will be more helpful. Few seek help from community members with similar concerns, focusing instead on receiving necessary assistance regardless of the source.

While most youth view NGOs positively, only a minority actively engage in raising awareness or civic activities, citing lack of time and suitable organizations as barriers. Active youth focus on human rights, children's rights, and helping the needy, influencing their family and social circles, and sometimes engaging with religious groups, community groups, and NGOs.

Youth primarily use media for socializing and entertainment, favoring social media over traditional platforms due to its perceived credibility, objectivity, and transparency. They distrust traditional media, viewing it as politicized and lacking credibility.

SAT-7 reaches 5% of the young population, with 2% viewership, particularly through documentaries and series that reach nearly 1% of youth.

LEBANON, OUR STORY – REPORT OF FINDINGS

INTRODUCTION

ENDLINE STUDY BACKGROUND

SAT-7 implemented an intervention called Lebanon, Our Story (LOS). The project utilized television by broadcasting a series called "For your eyes" and social media broadcasting a short documentary series called "Lebanon our story" to implement on the ground and media components. The project extended from 2021 to 2024.

The rationale of the project relied on the importance of narratives and media in shifting opinions. As a result, LOS utilized storytelling and civic engagement to create a 'shared narrative of hope' that targeted the increase in social cohesion between the various religious beliefs and nationalities residing in Lebanon, by targeting social cohesion between the Lebanese and the Syrian refugees in the short documentaries, and targeting the social cohesion between the different religious beliefs in the series "For your eyes".

The project targeted youth who are 15 to 25 year of age and who belong to various religious or belief groups including displaced Syrians, Palestinians, and Lebanese-Armenians.

As part of the project evaluation and assessment, SAT-7 targets to study the extent of the impact of the intervention on the youth. A baseline and an endline impact evaluation was performed, aiming to assess changes in youth's knowledge, attitude, and behavior as a result of exposure to the various media components.

SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY

The target sample of the LOS study was designed to be representative of the young population aged between 15 and 25 years old in Lebanon split across region, confession and nationality.

To understand the effect of the intervention on the youth a baseline and an endline survey was conducted with the youth who are 15 to 25 years of age, both male and female gender, across the Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian nationalities residing in Lebanon, and across all religious sects.

Endline survey sample:
- 1,268 Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI)
- 15 to 25 years old
- Gender: 59% male / 41% female
- Representative of varying religious groups and nationalities by region

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Governorate	Sample Achieved
Beirut	73
Bekaa	227
El Nabatieh	100
Mount Lebanon	459
North	265
South	144
Total	1,268

Table 1: Sample distribution across regions

Nationality	Sample Achieved
Lebanese	852
Armenian	24
Syrian	352
Palestinian	40
Total	1,268

Table 2: Sample distribution across nationalities

Religious Sect	Sample Achieved
Sunni	597
Shia	210
Maronite	196
Orthodox	73
Druze	65
Catholic	51
Armenian	67
Other religious group (Minorities)	8
Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)	1
Total	1268

Table 3: Sample distribution across religious sects

Quantitative Research: Endline

SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS

The study findings indicate that the surveyed sample for both the baseline and endline typically comprises single, mostly educated youth. The majority of these individuals are either employed or actively seeking employment, and most households consist of 4 to 5 members.

Chart 1: Highest level of education achieved by the respondent (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Chart 2: Current employment status of respondent (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Chart 3: respondent marital status (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Chart 4: Number of people in the household (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Chart 5: respondents that hold a second nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON

IMPACT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION ON THE YOUTH IN LEBANON

The current situation in Lebanon profoundly affects youth. A remarkable 95% report feeling impacted. However, a shift is evident between baseline and endline surveys. **Endline respondents indicate feeling less affected**. This change suggests an evolving relationship with ongoing challenges. It may reflect adaptation or shifting perspectives. Below chart visually represents this trend. It illustrates the nuanced changes in youth perceptions over time.

Chart 6: The extent to which the respondent feels personally impacted by the current situation in Lebanon (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

The current situation in Lebanon affects youth across all sects. However, nuances emerge in the intensity of impact. Sunni youth report the highest level of impact. 98% feel affected in both baseline and endline surveys. Syrian refugees, predominantly Sunni, unanimously report being impacted. This 100% rate underscores their vulnerability.

Other sects experience a comparatively lower intensity of impact. The table below illustrates these sectarian differences.

Religious Sect	Endline		Baseline	
	Strongly impacted	Somewhat impacted	Strongly impacted	Somewhat impacted
Sunni	75%	23%	91%	7%
Shia	59%	32%	74%	17%
Maronite	43%	51%	73%	21%
Orthodox	45%	42%	78%	18%
Druze	49%	46%	79%	16%
Catholic	31%	61%	74%	22%
Armenian	66%	25%	82%	11%

Minorities	75%	12%	81%	6%
Other non-religious beliefs	100%	-	100%	-

Table 4: The extent to which the respondent feels personally impacted by the current situation in Lebanon, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

It is evident that the current situation has the strongest impact on Palestinian (100%) and Syrian (baseline: 98%, endline:100%) refugees, as reflected in both the baseline and endline surveys. However, as shown in the overall impact, the intensity of the impact has decreased for both nationalities, and for all nationalities, in the endline survey compared to the baseline, as illustrated in the table below.

Nationality	Endline		Baseline	
	Strongly impacted	**Somewhat impacted**	**Strongly impacted**	**Somewhat impacted**
Lebanese	55%	38%	77%	17%
Armenian	67%	33%	88%	12%
Syrian	79%	21%	94%	4%
Palestinian	62%	38%	99%	1%

Table 5:The extent to which the respondent feels personally impacted by the current situation in Lebanon, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

The decrease in the intensity of the impact on various regions is evident, despite the ongoing conflict between Lebanon and Israel in the South and El Nabatieh, as illustrated in the chart below.

Governorate	Endline		Baseline	
	Strongly impacted	**Somewhat impacted**	**Strongly impacted**	**Somewhat impacted**
Beirut	63%	30%	77%	17%
Bekaa	52%	46%	87%	8%
El Nabatieh	63%	31%	100%	-
Mount Lebanon	61%	32%	77%	17%
North	71%	25%	87%	11%
South	65%	30%	83%	12%

Table 6: The extent to which the respondent feels personally impacted by the current situation in Lebanon, breakdown by Region (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

MAIN CURRENT CONCERNS OF THE YOUTH IN LEBANON

The primary concern of the youth has shifted from economic issues during the baseline, when Lebanon was in the midst of an economic and financial crisis, to **existential threats due to the escalating security situation and the war with Israel in South Lebanon**. The impact of these conflicts has overshadowed economic concerns in the current situation in Lebanon.

While losing the capacity to earn a sustainable livelihood remains a significant issue, it has become secondary to the youth, as unemployment and weakening purchasing power, though still important, are now less significant compared to concerns about physical safety.

Additionally, it is evident that COVID-19 and power outages are no longer major concerns when faced with existential threats and the risk of the war expanding.

Chart 7:Young people's main concerns in light of the current situation in Lebanon (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1681)

PLANS OF THE YOUTH FOR ENDURING THE CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON

Although immigration initially dominated the plans of youth, with 69% of baseline respondents considering it, the endline data shows a significant shift. Only 31% of endline respondents mentioned immigration, marking a decline of more than half. Instead, **seeking extra income** emerged as a more stable plan, mentioned by 42% of endline respondents.

Additionally, 26% of endline respondents reported having no plans at all, and 18% saw decreasing expenses as a last resort. The drive to protest and revolt appears to have diminished, as the youth have learned from recent history and no longer see protesting as a viable plan. The chart below illustrates the shift between the baseline and endline responses.

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
Chart 8:Youth personal plan to endure the current situation (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

When breaking down the data across different demographics, the picture shows varied responses to the situation. Lebanese and Palestinians primarily aim to seek extra income. In contrast, Syrians see immigration as the solution to their predicament. Residents of Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and the North focus on seeking **extra income** as their main plan. Conversely, Bekaa and El Nabatieh residents plan to **emigrate**. Residents of the South do not appear to have a main plan of action. The tables below reflect these results across different demographics.

Nationality	Endline				Baseline			
	Seeking extra income	Minimizing personal expenses	Planning to immigrate / leave the country	Not planning to do anything	Seeking extra income	Minimizing personal expenses	Protesting and going on strikes	Planning to immigrate / leave the country
Lebanese	<u>46%</u>	20%	25%	27%	47%	16%	4%	75%
Armenian	<u>54%</u>	50%	4%	42%	38%	25%	25%	75%
Syrian	30%	15%	<u>47%</u>	25%	41%	42%	1%	53%
Palestinian	<u>42%</u>	-	35%	25%	40%	58%	4%	59%

Table 7: Youth personal plan to endure the current situation, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Governorate	Endline				Baseline			
	Seeking extra income	Minimizing personal expenses	Planning to immigrate / leave the country	Not planning to do anything	Seeking extra income	Minimizing personal expenses	Protesting and going on strikes	Planning to immigrate / leave the country
Beirut	<u>45%</u>	19%	16%	34%	41%	17%	2%	79%
Bekaa	40%	24%	<u>43%</u>	16%	51%	27%	3%	71%

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El Nabatieh	31%	12%	33%	28%	25%	12%	-	88%
Mount Lebanon	48%	27%	24%	27%	39%	25%	4%	69%
North	44%	8%	38%	21%	49%	27%	2%	65%
South	26%	3%	28%	46%	48%	24%	5%	68%

Table 8: Youth personal plan to endure the current situation, breakdown by Region (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Religious Sect	Endline				Baseline			
	Seeking extra income	Minimizing personal expenses	Planning to immigrate / leave the country	Not planning to do anything	Seeking extra income	Minimizing personal expenses	Protesting and going on strikes	Planning to immigrate / leave the country
Sunni	36%	13%	40%	25%	40%	38%	2%	59%
Shia	42%	17%	28%	28%	48%	11%	6%	75%
Maronite	47%	21%	19%	30%	57%	14%	5%	82%
Orthodox	49%	22%	15%	34%	50%	15%	3%	74%
Druze	58%	22%	37%	18%	39%	8%	2%	81%
Catholic	27%	18%	29%	37%	44%	31%	4%	70%
Armenian	58%	52%	7%	16%	56%	20%	11%	76%
Minorities	75%	-	38%	-	50%	19%	-	81%
Other non-religious beliefs	100%	-	-	-	-	-	-	100%

Table 9: Youth personal plan to endure the current situation, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

CULTURAL OR SOCIETAL BARRIERS CURRENTLY FACED BY THE YOUTH IN LEBANON

For both baseline and endline respondents, **sectarian discrimination in the public sector** (baseline: 63%, endline: 30%) and **political favoritism** (baseline: 45%, endline: 35%) are the main social barriers perceived by youth. Additionally, class disparity (baseline: 38%, endline: 20%) and intolerance for differences (baseline: 27%, endline: 18%) are significant concerns.

Chart 9: Cultural or societal barriers currently faced by the youth in Lebanon? (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

When breaking down the data across different demographics, it is evident that Lebanese and Palestinians mainly face political favoritism. Syrians primarily encounter intolerance for differences. Political favoritism is the main barrier for residents of Beirut, Mount Lebanon, the North, and the South. In Bekaa and El Nabatieh, the main barrier is sectarian discrimination in the public sector. The religious sect breakdown shows political favoritism as the main barrier for all sects, except for Sunni and Minority respondents, who see sectarian discrimination in the public sector as their main obstacle. The tables below reflect these results across different demographics.

Nationality	Endline					Baseline				
	Sectarian discrimination in public sector	Intolerance for differences	Political favoritism	Lack of freedom of Speech	Class disparity	Sectarian discrimination in public sector	Intolerance for differences	Political favoritism	Lack of freedom of Speech	Class disparity
Lebanese	33%	11%	<u>48%</u>	9%	17%	66%	27%	47%	29%	36%
Armenian	<u>75%</u>	33%	25%	17%	21%	62%	50%	50%	50%	25%
Syrian	22%	<u>34%</u>	5%	20%	26%	54%	28%	39%	19%	37%
Palestinian	25%	18%	<u>28%</u>	8%	<u>28%</u>	62%	22%	36%	11%	60%

Table 10: Cultural or societal barriers currently faced by the youth in Lebanon? Breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Governorate	Endline					Baseline				
	Sectarian discrimination in public sector	Intolerance for differences	Political favoritism	Lack of freedom of Speech	Class disparity	Sectarian discrimination in public sector	Intolerance for differences	Political favoritism	Lack of freedom of Speech	Class disparity
Beirut	22%	10%	<u>53%</u>	10%	19%	61%	28%	48%	18%	21%
Bekaa	<u>39%</u>	24%	22%	16%	22%	65%	23%	40%	29%	43%
El Nabatieh	<u>36%</u>	20%	25%	10%	16%	75%	38%	75%	-	38%
Mount	31%	12%	<u>41%</u>	15%	20%	59%	32%	47%	21%	33%

Lebanon										
North	26%	23%	32%	6%	24%	64%	25%	42%	32%	44%
South	22%	19%	38%	8%	12%	66%	23%	46%	26%	39%

Table 11: Cultural or societal barriers currently faced by the youth in Lebanon? Breakdown by Region (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Religious Sect	Endline					Baseline				
	Sectarian discrimination in public sector	Intolerance for differences	Political favoritism	Lack of freedom of Speech	Class disparity	Sectarian discrimination in public sector	Intolerance for differences	Political favoritism	Lack of freedom of Speech	Class disparity
Sunni	27%	26%	20%	16%	24%	61%	30%	46%	16%	37%
Shia	34%	11%	37%	11%	20%	66%	19%	47%	31%	38%
Maronite	26%	7%	57%	5%	14%	69%	22%	34%	47%	41%
Orthodox	37%	8%	52%	7%	11%	40%	24%	47%	26%	40%
Druze	35%	6%	52%	11%	23%	84%	50%	61%	16%	29%
Catholic	37%	18%	43%	10%	14%	44%	24%	43%	28%	39%
Armenian	37%	15%	60%	13%	12%	69%	27%	44%	31%	31%
Minorities	75%	12%	25%	12%	25%	62%	6%	31%	50%	44%
Other non-religious beliefs	-	-	100%	-	-	-	-	-	100%	-

Table 12: Cultural or societal barriers currently faced by the youth in Lebanon? Breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

WHO TO BLAME FOR THE CURRENT CRISIS IN LEBANON?

It is evident that the youth surveyed, in both the baseline (82%) and endline (64%), **mainly blame political leaders for the crisis**. **Political parties** are also blamed, as indicated by 46% in the baseline and 24% in the endline. The endline survey highlights the perceived role of **the people** (41%) in the crisis, especially their sectarian division, as noted in the baseline survey (31%).

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
Chart 10: Who the youth blame for the current crisis in Lebanon (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Even when breaking down the data across all demographics, it is evident that the surveyed youth in Lebanon mainly blame political leaders for the current crisis. The people themselves come in second place when it comes to being blamed. This is reflected in the tables below.

Nationality	Endline						Baseline				
	Political leaders	Religious leaders	Political parties	NGO's	The divided people due to sectarian or political bias	The People	Political leaders	Religious leaders	Political parties	NGO's	The divided people due to sectarian or political bias
Lebanese	71%	4%	29%	1%	10%	46%	81%	28%	53%	9%	31%
Armenian	62%	-	25%	12%	79%	46%	75%	12%	50%	25%	75%
Syrian	46%	1%	12%	2%	14%	30%	85%	15%	28%	8%	24%
Palestinian	72%	2%	20%	-	8%	32%	84%	22%	35%	4%	49%

Table 13: Who the youth blame for the current crisis in Lebanon. Breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Governorate	Endline						Baseline				
	Political leaders	Religious leaders	Political parties	NGO's	The divided people due to sectarian or political bias	The People	Political leaders	Religious leaders	Political parties	NGO's	The divided people due to sectarian or political bias
Beirut	77%	1%	27%	-	3%	52%	82%	19%	57%	3%	39%
Bekaa	50%	1%	23%	3%	11%	30%	88%	24%	44%	8%	22%
El Nabatieh	56%	10%	25%	-	11%	40%	88%	25%	38%	25%	75%
Mount Lebanon	66%	2%	28%	2%	19%	43%	75%	22%	48%	9%	39%
North	70%	4%	21%	*	8%	46%	80%	21%	39%	7%	24%
South	70%	4%	15%	1%	6%	39%	89%	36%	50%	11%	30%

Table 14: Who the youth blame for the current crisis in Lebanon. Breakdown by Region (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Religious	Endline	Baseline

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Sect	Political leaders	Religious leaders	Political parties	NGO's	The divided people due to sectarian or political bias	The People	Political leaders	Religious leaders	Political parties	NGO's	The divided people due to sectarian or political bias
Sunni	<u>53%</u>	2%	19%	1%	13%	37%	82%	16%	35%	6%	32%
Shia	<u>65%</u>	7%	22%	1%	8%	37%	88%	33%	53%	11%	27%
Maronite	<u>84%</u>	1%	30%	1%	7%	50%	83%	37%	60%	14%	27%
Orthodox	<u>79%</u>	5%	36%	-	12%	56%	69%	28%	50%	8%	46%
Druze	<u>69%</u>	3%	25%	2%	11%	43%	84%	18%	52%	8%	45%
Catholic	<u>82%</u>	2%	37%	-	16%	49%	74%	35%	65%	6%	15%
Armenian	<u>69%</u>	3%	33%	6%	28%	46%	84%	22%	56%	11%	31%
Minorities	<u>75%</u>	12%	38%	-	25%	50%	81%	50%	75%	6%	25%
Other non-religious beliefs	<u>100%</u>	-	100%	-	-	-	-	-	100%	-	-

Table 15: Who the youth blame for the current crisis in Lebanon. Breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

ASPIRATIONS OF THE YOUTH IN LEBANON

LIFE PRIORITIES OF YOUTH IN LEBANON

Youth priorities reflect Lebanon's current challenges. **Economic stability** tops the list, rising from 44% in the baseline to 54%. In the endline Employment remains crucial, though shifting from 60% to 33%. Education's priority decreased from 50% to 18%. Family creation and protection maintain significance, moving from 30% to 24%. Emigration emerges as a growing concern, jumping from 1% to 17%. This surge suggests increasing disillusionment. Equality receives minimal attention, declining further from an already low baseline.

These shifts reveal evolving youth perspectives. They prioritize immediate needs over long-term societal issues. The data paints a picture of youth focused on survival and personal advancement. It suggests a pragmatic response to Lebanon's economic and social pressures.

This reprioritization offers insights into the changing mindset of Lebanese youth. It highlights areas requiring urgent attention in policy and social programs.

Chart 11: Youth priorities in life (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Economic stability/welfare is reflected as the main life priority for almost all the different demographics in Lebanon as reflected in the below tables.

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	Armenian	Syrian	Palestinian
Endline	Economic stability/ welfare	60%	42%	42%	62%
	Social stability/ security	26%	67%	36%	28%
	Equality	5%	12%	1%	2%
	Employment	39%	25%	20%	32%

	Making a family/ protecting my family	21%	42%	27%	32%
	Education	19%	17%	14%	22%
	Emigration /travel	10%	4%	36%	18%
Baseline	Economic stability/ welfare	42%	38%	49%	39%
	Social stability/ security	27%	38%	49%	42%
	Equality	7%	62%	28%	10%
	Employment	62%	62%	53%	65%
	Making a family/ protecting my family	27%	62%	34%	40%
	Education	57%	50%	33%	36%

Table 16: Youth priorities in life. Breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Governorate					
		Beirut	Bekaa	El Nabatieh	Mount Lebanon	North	South
Endline	Economic stability/ welfare	74%	51%	40%	51%	63%	56%
	Social stability/ security	21%	28%	30%	32%	32%	25%
	Equality	8%	4%	2%	5%	2%	2%
	Employment	25%	36%	17%	41%	34%	19%
	Making a family/ protecting my family	12%	24%	19%	25%	22%	28%
	Education	11%	19%	28%	19%	14%	17%
	Emigration /travel	11%	32%	20%	10%	19%	15%
Baseline	Economic stability/ welfare	37%	52%	50%	38%	43%	48%
	Social stability/ security	29%	32%	50%	32%	36%	36%
	Equality	10%	18%	-	10%	13%	13%
	Employment	49%	62%	38%	58%	63%	64%
	Making a family/ protecting my family	42%	42%	50%	25%	25%	26%
	Education	53%	41%	25%	53%	53%	48%

Table 17: Youth priorities in life. Breakdown by Region (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	Shia	Maronite	Orthodox	Druze	Catholic	Armenian	Minorities	Other non-religious beliefs
Endline	Economic stability/ welfare	49%	45%	72%	71%	51%	57%	61%	88%	100%
	Social stability/ security	33%	26%	25%	18%	17%	33%	45%	50%	-
	Equality	2%	6%	2%	8%	2%	4%	13%	25%	-
	Employment	27%	30%	39%	44%	51%	43%	43%	50%	100%
	Making a family/ protecting my family	27%	23%	13%	22%	35%	25%	16%	38%	-
	Education	15%	30%	17%	15%	18%	24%	9%	12%	-
	Emigration /travel	27%	14%	4%	4%	12%	12%	4%	25%	-
Baseline	Economic stability/ welfare	45%	41%	42%	45%	50%	37%	42%	38%	-
	Social stability/ security	40%	29%	27%	31%	19%	30%	27%	25%	-

Equality	19%	7%	10%	4%	6%	2%	16%	12%	-
Employment	58%	59%	67%	56%	68%	59%	69%	69%	100%
Making a family/ protecting my family	33%	35%	20%	27%	23%	35%	16%	19%	100%
Education	45%	51%	58%	42%	69%	54%	58%	62%	-

Table 18: Youth priorities in life. Breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

VALUES YOUTH IN LEBANON LIVE BY AND TRY TO PRESERVE

Family values and kinship preservation remain paramount for surveyed youth. However, their importance decreased from 64% in the baseline to 46% in the endline. Respect, honesty, and moral values follow at 40%. Religious values hold steady at 20%. Notably, altruism across backgrounds declined sharply, from 21% to 8%. This shift may reflect integration into broader moral and religious values.

Youth demonstrate strong religious practice. An increase from 80% to 94% report actively practicing their faith. These trends reveal a complex value system. Traditional family ties remain central, yet are evolving. The high religious practice suggests faith's significant role in shaping youth values.

Chart 12: Values that the youth live by and try to preserve (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

It is evident that Lebanese youth, including Lebanese Armenians, primarily live by and strive to preserve family values. In contrast, Palestinians and Syrians mainly live by and aim to preserve moral values first and then family values, as reflected in the table below.

	Nationality			
	Lebanese	**Armenian**	**Syrian**	**Palestinian**

	Family values/ preserving kinship	51%	67%	34%	40%
	Helping whomever is in need regardless of who they are	6%	4%	7%	2%
	Building strong social ties	8%	4%	8%	10%
	Honesty	16%	33%	21%	10%
Endline	Respect for self and others	33%	38%	30%	25%
	Responsibility towards society	5%	17%	2%	5%
	Not to contribute to waste	1%	8%	1%	-
	Religious values	17%	-	26%	32%
	Moral Values	37%	29%	47%	45%
	Family values/ preserving kinship	60%	62%	76%	72%
	Helping whomever is in need regardless of who they are	19%	25%	30%	11%
	Building strong social ties	26%	50%	35%	35%
Baseline	Honesty	48%	62%	38%	45%
	Respect for self and others	65%	38%	39%	56%
	Responsibility towards society	31%	25%	26%	24%
	Not to contribute to waste	6%	25%	18%	15%

Table 19: Values that the youth live by and try to preserve. Breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

As for the breakdown by region, youth in Beirut, Bekaa, Mount Lebanon, and the South primarily live by and preserve family values. In contrast, youth in El Nabatieh focus on respect for self and others as their main value. Meanwhile, youth in the North mainly live by and preserve moral values, as reflected in the table below.

		Governorate					
		Beirut	Bekaa	El Nabatieh	Mount Lebanon	North	South
	Family values/ preserving kinship	68%	48%	31%	58%	23%	49%
	Helping whomever is in need regardless of who they are	7%	11%	4%	4%	9%	4%
	Building strong social ties	8%	13%	7%	6%	8%	6%
	Honesty	10%	19%	15%	20%	18%	13%
Endline	Respect for self and others	19%	33%	48%	29%	39%	25%
	Responsibility towards society	3%	8%	-	5%	2%	4%
	Not to contribute to waste	-	1%	-	2%	*	1%
	Religious values	11%	23%	27%	12%	29%	21%
	Moral Values	29%	38%	32%	42%	53%	26%
	Family values/ preserving kinship	59%	72%	75%	60%	67%	62%
	Helping whomever is in need regardless of who they are	14%	22%	38%	24%	19%	19%
	Building strong social ties	21%	24%	25%	35%	30%	24%
Baseline	Honesty	43%	56%	38%	36%	45%	52%
	Respect for self and others	49%	59%	62%	52%	61%	70%
	Responsibility towards society	12%	38%	25%	25%	29%	34%
	Not to contribute to waste	2%	18%	-	7%	10%	8%

Table 20: Values that the youth live by and try to preserve. Breakdown by Region (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Additionally, family values topped the list of main values lived by and preserved by all sects except for Sunni, Catholics, and Minorities, although they still reflected a high ratio. Sunni youth mainly live by and preserve moral values, while Catholic and Minorities youth primarily focus on respect for self and others, as shown in the table below.

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	**Shia**	**Maronite**	**Orthodox**	**Druze**	**Catholic**	**Armenian**	**Minorities**	**Other non-religious beliefs**
Endline	**Family values/ preserving kinship**	35%	45%	61%	67%	62%	47%	72%	25%	-
	Helping whomever is in need regardless of who they are	9%	4%	5%	5%	3%	4%	1%	-	-
	Building strong social ties	9%	11%	7%	3%	5%	6%	3%	12%	-
	Honesty	20%	15%	13%	11%	22%	18%	25%	12%	-
	Respect for self and others	31%	40%	21%	30%	29%	49%	33%	62%	100%
	Responsibility towards society	3%	3%	7%	4%	2%	16%	7%	-	-
	Not to contribute to waste	1%	1%	1%	3%	3%	-	3%	-	-
	Religious values	25%	24%	9%	10%	20%	16%	3%	50%	-
	Moral Values	46%	30%	35%	26%	51%	41%	30%	100%	-
Baseline	**Family values/ preserving kinship**	69%	53%	69%	59%	40%	63%	69%	81%	100%
	Helping whomever is in need regardless of who they are	24%	21%	17%	19%	24%	13%	16%	6%	-
	Building strong social ties	34%	20%	18%	32%	47%	24%	29%	6%	-
	Honesty	42%	59%	47%	36%	37%	41%	47%	62%	-
	Respect for self and others	51%	72%	64%	53%	77%	48%	53%	81%	100%
	Responsibility towards society	24%	35%	39%	32%	35%	26%	22%	44%	-
	Not to contribute to waste	14%	6%	7%	6%	6%	7%	2%	6%	-

Table 21: Values that the youth live by and try to preserve. Breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

IDEAL COUNTRY OF LEBANON

The opinions and views of the youth surveyed in the endline are consistent with those in the baseline. The majority believe that the ideal country would be **peaceful** (baseline: 46%, endline: 33%). They want **social and economic justice** enforced (baseline: 47%, endline: 30%). They envision a country where people are united under one **Lebanese identity** (baseline: 35%, endline: 27%). They desire a nation free from corruption (baseline: 42%, endline: 26%). They value tolerance and acceptance of others (baseline: 33%, endline: 20%) and support the expression of free speech and faith.

Chart 13: The ideal country of Lebanon as the youth would like to see and live in (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

WAYS OF ACHIEVING THE IDEAL SOCIETY IN LEBANON

Both the baseline and endline surveyed youth believe that **raising social awareness** (baseline: 54%, endline: 35%) is crucial for achieving an ideal society and country. They also emphasize the importance of **electing ethical leaders** (baseline: 51%, endline: 35%). Educating the youth (baseline: 30%, endline: 25%) and holding politicians and public servants accountable (baseline: 28%, endline: 19%) are also seen as essential steps. A significant minority consider removing the clergy's influence from political life (baseline: 28%, endline: 6%) and abolishing sectarianism from the constitution by amending it (baseline: 26%, endline: 13%) as necessary changes.

Chart 14:The youth view regarding the ways to achieve the ideal society/country and make it work (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Lebanese Youth, including Lebanese Armenian, and Palestinians' main way towards achieving their vision of an ideal Lebanon is by electing ethical leaders who love their country more than themselves, in addition to raising social awareness which is complementary to their main way, as reflected in below table.

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	**Armenian**	**Syrian**	**Palestinian**
Endline	**Electing ethical leaders who love their country more than themselves**	<u>41%</u>	<u>54%</u>	30%	<u>40%</u>
	Enacting accountability	25%	21%	6%	22%
	Changing the constitution and annulling sectarianism	17%	8%	5%	2%
	Removing the clergy from the political life	7%	-	2%	5%
	Raising social awareness	31%	50%	<u>42%</u>	<u>40%</u>
	Educating the youth	23%	42%	30%	32%
Baseline	**Electing ethical leaders who love their country more than themselves**	51%	50%	52%	45%
	Enacting accountability	24%	62%	38%	41%
	Changing the constitution and annulling sectarianism	27%	50%	22%	31%
	Removing the clergy from the political life	32%	38%	24%	20%
	Raising social awareness	55%	75%	48%	62%
	Educating the youth	33%	50%	22%	31%

Table 22: The youth view regarding the ways to achieve the ideal society/country and make it work. Breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

LEBANON, OUR STORY – REPORT OF FINDINGS

Additionally, Lebanese youth in El Nabatieh, the North, and the South believe that electing ethical leaders who prioritize the country over themselves is the main way to achieve their vision of an ideal Lebanon. Beirut youth see enacting accountability as the primary solution. Youth in Bekaa and Mount Lebanon consider raising social awareness as the key to realizing their vision of an ideal Lebanon, as shown in the table below.

				Governorate			
		Beirut	Bekaa	El Nabatieh	Mount Lebanon	North	South
Endline	Electing ethical leaders who love their country more than themselves	32%	36%	<u>42%</u>	36%	<u>46%</u>	<u>34%</u>
	Enacting accountability	<u>36%</u>	14%	11%	18%	20%	27%
	Changing the constitution and annulling sectarianism	25%	14%	5%	19%	6%	7%
	Removing the clergy from the political life	4%	7%	5%	8%	3%	2%
	Raising social awareness	29%	<u>42%</u>	23%	<u>37%</u>	33%	30%
	Educating the youth	15%	32%	26%	26%	24%	19%
Baseline	Electing ethical leaders who love their country more than themselves	53%	64%	25%	39%	53%	57%
	Enacting accountability	38%	32%	50%	29%	25%	24%
	Changing the constitution and annulling sectarianism	19%	27%	25%	27%	26%	28%
	Removing the clergy from the political life	16%	32%	25%	33%	27%	29%
	Raising social awareness	47%	56%	50%	52%	61%	50%
	Educating the youth	26%	25%	25%	31%	38%	26%

Table 23: The youth view regarding the ways to achieve the ideal society/country and make it work. Breakdown by Region (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Additionally, electing ethical leaders who prioritize their country over themselves is seen as the main way to achieve an ideal Lebanon by youth of all religious sects, except for Sunni and Druze. These groups believe that raising social awareness is the primary path toward achieving their vision of an ideal Lebanon, as shown in the table below.

					Religious sect					
		Sunni	Shia	Maronite	Orthodox	Druze	Catholic	Armenian	Minorities	Other non-religious beliefs
Endline	Electing ethical leaders who love their country more than themselves	34%	<u>39%</u>	<u>38%</u>	<u>49%</u>	38%	<u>61%</u>	<u>40%</u>	<u>62%</u>	100%
	Enacting accountability	13%	15%	35%	29%	17%	29%	24%	12%	-
	Changing the constitution and annulling sectarianism	8%	13%	17%	19%	15%	8%	39%	12%	-
	Removing the clergy from the political life	2%	6%	10%	8%	14%	12%	6%	12%	-
	Raising social awareness	<u>41%</u>	31%	21%	26%	<u>51%</u>	27%	22%	75%	-
	Educating the youth	28%	23%	17%	23%	40%	27%	21%	38%	100%
Baseline	Electing ethical leaders who love their country more than themselves	49%	55%	59%	46%	34%	41%	56%	81%	-
	Enacting accountability	34%	19%	27%	28%	8%	26%	29%	38%	-
	Changing the constitution and annulling sectarianism	26%	25%	27%	23%	34%	26%	31%	19%	-

Removing the clergy from the political life	23%	31%	41%	29%	44%	31%	27%	38%	-
Raising social awareness	54%	52%	53%	53%	74%	46%	49%	56%	100%
Educating the youth	30%	23%	30%	28%	58%	24%	36%	38%	100%

Table 24: The youth view regarding the ways to achieve the ideal society/country and make it work. Breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

HOPE

ENCOURAGING OPEN PRACTICE OF RELIGION & RESPECTIVE REASONS

There is an even stronger connection between youth and religious faith. **The rate of religious practicing youth increased to 94%**. Their encouragement for **open practice of belief and religion rose to 91%**. This is compared to the baseline, which was already considered high.

Chart 15: the rate of youth encouraging open religious and belief practice (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

The youth cited **personal freedom of religious practice and respecting others beliefs and religion** as the main the reasons for encouraging open practice.

Chart 16: The reasons behind the youth encouraging open religious/belief practice (Baseline N=1051, Endline N=1152)

While the encouraging youth cited personal freedom and respect, the minority that discourages the open practice cited **avoiding trouble and respecting the surrounding and personal freedom of others**. Additionally, they believe religion is a personal matter that should be practiced privately.

Chart 17: The reasons behind the youth encouraging open religious/belief practice (Baseline N=220, Endline N=116)

LIKELIHOOD OF A SOCIETY OF DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES LIVING HARMONIOUSLY TOGETHER

The youth believe that the **likelihood of various groups and communities living together in harmony is higher than the unlikelihood**. However, there is a notable shift between the baseline and endline surveys. Certainty decreased, and unlikelihood increased in the endline survey compared to the baseline. This is especially true regarding the ability of the host community and refugees to live together in harmony, with unlikelihood increasing by 211%, as shown in the charts below. Armenian youth-maintained optimism about religious coexistence but grew more pessimistic about host/refugee relations. Among sects, Maronites and Orthodox Christians showed the most striking transformation, with Maronites shifting from 41% viewing religious coexistence as "very unlikely/impossible" to just 3%. However, their outlook on host/refugee coexistence worsened. Sunni Muslims consistently maintained a positive outlook, while Druze became more optimistic about religious coexistence but more pessimistic about host/refugee relations, as reflected in the tables below.

Chart 18: The extent the youth believe a society of Religious & non-religious groups can live harmoniously together (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	Armenian	Syrian	Palestinian
Endline	Very unlikely / impossible	3%	-	2%	-
	Unlikely	14%	17%	19%	22%
	Neither likely nor unlikely	8%	8%	4%	12%
	Likely	48%	62%	60%	35%
	Very likely	23%	8%	13%	25%
	Certain	5%	4%	3%	5%
Baseline	Very unlikely / impossible	23%	-	7%	9%
	Unlikely	9%	-	13%	8%
	Neither likely nor unlikely	6%	-	10%	9%
	Likely	34%	62%	56%	51%
	Very likely	19%	12%	13%	18%
	Certain	8%	25%	1%	6%

Table 25: The extent the youth believe a society of Religious & non-religious groups can live harmoniously together, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	Shia	Maronite	Orthodox	Druze	Catholic	Armenian	Other religious group (Minorities)	Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)
Endline	Very unlikely / impossible	2%	4%	3%	3%	-	-	-	12%	-
	Unlikely	19%	21%	7%	8%	12%	18%	6%	25%	-
	Neither likely nor unlikely	6%	8%	8%	3%	12%	2%	7%	12%	-
	Likely	54%	41%	55%	55%	48%	61%	34%	38%	-
	Very likely	16%	21%	23%	29%	2%	14%	49%	12%	-

	Certain	3%	4%	5%	3%	26%	6%	3%	-	100%
Baseline	Very unlikely / impossible	6%	30%	41%	18%	16%	20%	24%	50%	-
	Unlikely	11%	8%	5%	13%	16%	9%	-	12%	-
	Neither likely nor unlikely	9%	6%	5%	6%	5%	13%	-	-	-
	Likely	50%	30%	26%	40%	39%	31%	33%	12%	100%
	Very likely	19%	11%	20%	17%	16%	22%	31%	12%	-
	Certain	4%	16%	3%	6%	8%	4%	11%	12%	-

Table 26: The extent the youth believe a society of Religious & non-religious groups can live harmoniously together, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Chart 19: The extent the youth believe a society of host and refugee communities can live harmoniously together (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	Armenian	Syrian	Palestinian
Endline	Very unlikely / impossible	5%	12%	*	-
	Unlikely	34%	33%	13%	8%
	Neither likely nor unlikely	10%	4%	11%	5%
	Likely	33%	46%	54%	38%
	Very likely	16%	-	19%	38%
	Certain	2%	4%	3%	12%
Baseline	Very unlikely / impossible	23%	-	3%	6%
	Unlikely	10%	-	8%	2%
	Neither likely nor unlikely	8%	-	15%	14%
	Likely	28%	88%	51%	52%
	Very likely	21%	-	13%	20%
	Certain	10%	12%	9%	5%

Table 27: The extent the youth believe a society of host and refugee communities can live harmoniously together, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	Shia	Maronite	Orthodox	Druze	Catholic	Armenian	Other religious group (Minorities)	Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)
Endline	Very unlikely / impossible	1%	5%	6%	7%	14%	10%	7%	-	-
	Unlikely	17%	30%	46%	40%	32%	45%	30%	38%	-
	Neither likely nor unlikely	9%	12%	13%	11%	11%	8%	4%	12%	-
	Likely	49%	34%	27%	32%	40%	27%	25%	12%	-
	Very likely	22%	16%	7%	10%	3%	10%	30%	38%	-
	Certain	3%	4%	2%	1%	-	-	3%	-	100%
Baseline	Very unlikely / impossible	3%	29%	40%	22%	15%	20%	22%	56%	-
	Unlikely	9%	10%	9%	10%	3%	13%	2%	-	-
	Neither likely nor unlikely	14%	7%	6%	5%	6%	17%	-	6%	-
	Likely	45%	26%	21%	36%	44%	26%	31%	25%	100%
	Very likely	20%	12%	21%	17%	19%	22%	31%	6%	-
	Certain	9%	17%	3%	10%	13%	2%	13%	6%	-

Table 28: The extent the youth believe a society of host and refugee communities can live harmoniously together, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Chart 20: The extent the youth believe a society of different religious groups can live harmoniously together (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	Armenian	Syrian	Palestinian
Endline	Very unlikely / impossible	*	-	*	-
	Unlikely	5%	12%	12%	5%
	Neither likely nor unlikely	4%	8%	4%	5%
	Likely	48%	71%	56%	35%
	Very likely	32%	4%	24%	38%

	Certain	10%	4%	4%	18%
Baseline	**Very unlikely / impossible**	22%	-	3%	6%
	Unlikely	4%	-	5%	9%
	Neither likely nor unlikely	4%	-	10%	9%
	Likely	23%	62%	50%	48%
	Very likely	28%	12%	19%	18%
	Certain	18%	25%	12%	11%

Table 29: The extent the youth believe a society of different religious groups can live harmoniously together, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	**Shia**	**Maronite**	**Orthodox**	**Druze**	**Catholic**	**Armenian**	**Other religious group (Minorities)**	**Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)**
Endline	**Very unlikely / impossible**	*	1%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Unlikely	10%	7%	4%	7%	-	6%	4%	-	-
	Neither likely nor unlikely	4%	5%	6%	-	2%	2%	6%	-	-
	Likely	54%	41%	53%	52%	49%	59%	37%	12%	-
	Very likely	28%	33%	26%	34%	12%	25%	49%	75%	-
	Certain	4%	12%	11%	7%	37%	8%	3%	12%	100%
Baseline	**Very unlikely / impossible**	3%	27%	40%	18%	15%	20%	22%	56%	-
	Unlikely	6%	4%	4%	1%	-	7%	-	-	-
	Neither likely nor unlikely	9%	3%	3%	5%	2%	11%	-	-	-
	Likely	41%	22%	19%	31%	18%	26%	27%	12%	100%
	Very likely	26%	17%	25%	27%	44%	28%	31%	12%	-
	Certain	15%	26%	10%	18%	23%	7%	20%	19%	-

Table 30: The extent the youth believe a society of different religious groups can live harmoniously together, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

PERCEIVED EFFECT OF GREATER MIXING BETWEEN VARIOUS COMMUNITIES

The youth in Lebanon generally view the **mixing of different communities within society more positively than negatively**. However, their positivity is notably less when it comes to the mixing of host and refugee communities. They are more positive about mixing religious groups among themselves or with non-religious groups within society.

Refugee youth, both Syrian and Palestinian, demonstrate the most positive outlook on host-refugee mixing, with over 80% perceiving it positively. In contrast, Lebanese youth are more divided, with only about 50% viewing it positively. Among religious sects, Sunni Muslims consistently show the most positive attitude towards both types of community mixing. Christians, particularly Maronites and Orthodox, along with Druze, express more negative views towards host-refugee mixing, with 55-66% perceiving it negatively. Interestingly, there's a significant positive shift in Maronite attitudes towards religious and non-religious mixing, increasing from 49% positive in the baseline to 85% in the endline survey. Armenian youth show a notable decrease in positivity towards host-refugee mixing, dropping from 88% to 50% between surveys, as reflected in the tables below. Overall, while religious and non-religious

mixing is viewed favorably across most groups, host-refugee mixing remains a more contentious issue, highlighting persistent social divisions.

Chart 21: The perceived positive or negative effect on the youth and their family regarding the effect of a greater mixing of communities between different religious groups within society (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Chart 22: The perceived positive or negative effect on the youth and their family regarding the effect of a greater mixing of communities between host & refugee communities within society (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	Armenian	Syrian	Palestinian
Endline	**Positive effect**	51%	50%	82%	92%
	Negative effect	49%	50%	18%	8%
Baseline	**Positive effect**	52%	88%	84%	85%
	Negative effect	48%	12%	16%	15%

Table 31: The perceived positive or negative effect on the youth and their family regarding the effect of a greater mixing of communities between host & refugee communities within society, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	Shia	Maronite	Orthodox	Druze	Catholic	Armenian	Other religious group (Minorities)	Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)
Endline	**Positive effect**	78%	53%	39%	34%	45%	39%	63%	50%	100%
	Negative effect	22%	47%	<u>61%</u>	<u>66%</u>	<u>55%</u>	<u>61%</u>	37%	50%	-
Baseline	**Positive effect**	76%	50%	40%	64%	47%	50%	64%	25%	100%
	Negative effect	24%	50%	60%	36%	53%	50%	36%	75%	-

Table 32: The perceived positive or negative effect on the youth and their family regarding the effect of a greater mixing of communities between host & refugee communities within society, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Chart 23: The perceived positive or negative effect on the youth and their family regarding the effect of a greater mixing of communities between religious & non-religious groups within society (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	Armenian	Syrian	Palestinian
Endline	**Positive effect**	78%	79%	75%	68%
	Negative effect	22%	21%	25%	32%
Baseline	**Positive effect**	63%	100%	75%	86%
	Negative effect	37%	-	25%	14%

Table 33: The perceived positive or negative effect on the youth and their family regarding the effect of a greater mixing of communities between religious & non-religious groups within society, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	Shia	Maronite	Orthodox	Druze	Catholic	Armenian	Other religious group (Minorities)	Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)
Endline	**Positive effect**	74%	71%	<u>85%</u>	<u>85%</u>	78%	<u>80%</u>	<u>93%</u>	50%	100%
	Negative effect	26%	29%	15%	15%	22%	20%	7%	50%	-

Baseline	**Positive effect**	78%	60%	49%	71%	60%	61%	71%	38%	100%
	Negative effect	22%	40%	51%	29%	40%	39%	29%	62%	-

Table 34: The perceived positive or negative effect on the youth and their family regarding the effect of a greater mixing of communities between religious & non-religious groups within society, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

HOPEFULNESS ABOUT RELATIONS IMPROVING BETWEEN DIFFERENT GROUPS IN LEBANON

The youth in Lebanon reflect a **positive view on the likelihood of various groups and communities living together in harmony**. They also perceive a positive effect from mixing these groups. Additionally, they show hope for improving relations between different groups and communities in Lebanon. However, it is important to note that the youth are more hopeful about improving relations between religious and non-religious communities, and among different religious communities, than between host and refugee communities, as shown in the charts below.

The demographic breakdown reveals that Armenian youth show the most significant increase in optimism regarding relations between religious and non-religious groups, with 83% feeling somewhat or very hopeful in the endline survey, up from 50% in the baseline. Conversely, Palestinian youth exhibit a more complex shift, with both increased hopefulness (53% somewhat or very hopeful) and unhopfulness (36% somewhat or very unhopeful) in the endline survey. Among religious sects, Sunni youth consistently demonstrate higher levels of hope across all categories, particularly regarding host-refugee relations, with 70% feeling somewhat or very hopeful in the endline survey. This contrasts sharply with Maronite, Orthodox, and Catholic youth, who show significantly lower levels of hope for host-refugee relations (30%, 30%, and 34% respectively feeling somewhat or very hopeful). Druze youth display a notable increase in hopefulness about religious and non-religious group relations, rising from 52% to 60% feeling somewhat or very hopeful.

Regarding host-refugee relations, Syrian youth show the most positive outlook, with 77% feeling somewhat or very hopeful in the endline survey, while Lebanese youth demonstrate increased pessimism, with 49% feeling somewhat or very unhopeful. These trends highlight the complex interplay of national and religious identities in shaping attitudes towards community relations in Lebanon, with refugee communities generally expressing more optimism than host communities, as reflected in the tables below.

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
Chart 24: The level of hope amongst the youth when they think about relations improving between religious & non-religious groups in Lebanon (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	Armenian	Syrian	Palestinian
Endline	Very unhopeful	7%	4%	8%	8%
	Somewhat unhopeful	22%	8%	15%	28%
	Neither hopeful nor unhopeful	7%	4%	4%	12%
	Somewhat hopeful	42%	50%	46%	25%
	Very hopeful	22%	33%	28%	28%
Baseline	Very unhopeful	28%	-	12%	11%
	Somewhat unhopeful	10%	25%	9%	6%
	Neither hopeful nor unhopeful	13%	25%	22%	21%
	Somewhat hopeful	29%	50%	41%	46%
	Very hopeful	20%	-	16%	15%

Table 35: The level of hope amongst the youth when they think about relations improving between religious & non-religious groups in Lebanon, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	Shia	Maronite	Orthodox	Druze	Catholic	Armenian	Other religious group (Minorities)	Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)
Endline	Very unhopeful	8%	7%	4%	7%	8%	10%	3%	25%	-
	Somewhat unhopeful	17%	20%	30%	29%	20%	20%	4%	25%	-
	Neither hopeful nor unhopeful	5%	9%	7%	1%	12%	12%	3%		-
	Somewhat hopeful	42%	49%	44%	37%	29%	37%	45%	50%	-
	Very hopeful	27%	15%	15%	26%	31%	22%	45%	-	100%
Baseline	Very unhopeful	12%	30%	42%	28%	24%	22%	24%	56%	-
	Somewhat unhopeful	8%	10%	11%	8%	21%	19%	4%	6%	-

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Neither hopeful nor unhopeful	21%	12%	9%	18%	3%	19%	13%	6%	100%
Somewhat hopeful	40%	20%	27%	29%	37%	33%	40%	19%	-
Very hopeful	18%	28%	12%	17%	15%	7%	18%	12%	-

Table 36: The level of hope amongst the youth when they think about relations improving between religious & non-religious groups in Lebanon, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Chart 25: The level of hope amongst the youth when they think about relations improving between host & refugee communities in Lebanon (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	**Armenian**	**Syrian**	**Palestinian**
Endline	**Very unhopeful**	12%	25%	4%	-
	Somewhat unhopeful	37%	17%	12%	15%
	Neither hopeful nor unhopeful	9%	4%	8%	10%
	Somewhat hopeful	29%	33%	45%	30%
	Very hopeful	14%	21%	32%	45%
Baseline	**Very unhopeful**	27%	12%	3%	9%
	Somewhat unhopeful	16%	-	16%	12%
	Neither hopeful nor unhopeful	16%	50%	17%	19%
	Somewhat hopeful	23%	25%	45%	41%
	Very hopeful	19%	12%	19%	19%

Table 37: The level of hope amongst the youth when they think about relations improving between host & refugee communities in Lebanon, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	**Shia**	**Maronite**	**Orthodox**	**Druze**	**Catholic**	**Armenian**	**Other religious group (Minorities)**	**Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)**
Endline	**Very unhopeful**	5%	11%	11%	18%	25%	16%	15%	-	-
	Somewhat unhopeful	17%	33%	52%	47%	31%	47%	19%	50%	-

	Neither hopeful nor unhopeful	8%	12%	7%	5%	11%	4%	10%	-	-
	Somewhat hopeful	40%	32%	24%	25%	31%	22%	24%	25%	-
	Very hopeful	30%	10%	6%	5%	3%	12%	31%	25%	100%
Baseline	**Very unhopeful**	6%	28%	44%	27%	19%	22%	24%	56%	-
	Somewhat unhopeful	17%	19%	14%	10%	13%	17%	4%	6%	-
	Neither hopeful nor unhopeful	19%	16%	8%	17%	16%	22%	24%	12%	100%
	Somewhat hopeful	38%	15%	22%	26%	27%	30%	27%	12%	-
	Very hopeful	20%	21%	12%	21%	24%	9%	20%	12%	-

Table 38: The level of hope amongst the youth when they think about relations improving between host & refugee communities in Lebanon, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Chart 26: The level of hope amongst the youth when they think about relations improving between different religious groups in Lebanon (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Narrative of hope for religious & non-religious groups explained

Chart 27: Reasons behind youth being hopeful about relations improving between religious and non-religious groups (Baseline N=653, Endline N=845)

Lack of awareness among the people — Baseline 6%, Endline 4%
Difficulty of the social and economic situation — Baseline 21%, Endline 5%
Difference in customs, traditions and ways of living — Baseline 1%, Endline 6%
The country is corrupt and cannot be improved — Baseline 29%, Endline 6%
Not possible — Endline 9%
They don't believe in religion — Baseline 17%, Endline 45%
Religious intolerance and racism — Baseline 13%, Endline 47%

Legend: Baseline, Endline

Chart 28: Reasons behind youth not being hopeful about relations improving between religious and non-religious groups (Baseline N=414, Endline N=342)

Difficulty of the social and economic situation — Baseline 11%, Endline 1%
I don't care — Baseline 5%, Endline 9%
Religious intolerance and racism — Baseline 7%, Endline 10%
The importance of improving coexistence — Baseline 5%, Endline 12%
Equality and humane treatment — Endline 12%
Lack of awareness among the people — Endline 16%
There is no problem provided that the respect for… — Baseline 4%, Endline 22%
Respect the rights and opinions of others — Baseline 17%, Endline 27%

Legend: Baseline, Endline

Chart 29: Reasons behind youth being neither hopeful nor unhopeful about relations improving between religious and non-religious groups (Baseline N=204, Endline N=81)

Narrative of hope for different religious groups explained

Chart 30: Reasons behind youth being hopeful about relations improving between different religious groups (Baseline N=805, Endline N=1021)

Chart 31: Reasons behind youth not being hopeful about relations improving between different religious groups (Baseline N=315, Endline N=196)

Chart 32: Reasons behind youth being neither hopeful nor unhopeful about relations improving between different religious groups (Baseline N=151, Endline N=51)

Narrative of hope for different host & refugee communities

Chart 33: Reasons behind youth being hopeful about relations improving between host & refugee communities (Baseline N=608, Endline N=673)

Chart 34: Reasons behind youth not being hopeful about relations improving between host & refugee communities (Baseline N=452, Endline N=486)

Chart 35: Reasons behind youth being neither hopeful nor unhopeful about relations improving between different religious groups (Baseline N=211, Endline N=109)

DRIVERS OF COMMONALITIES AND UNITY WITHOUT DIMINISHING DIVERSITY

The surveyed youth believe that achieving social commonality and unity among residents, both Lebanese and refugees, requires several key drivers. **Lebanon needs to implement equality, justice, and security. Improving the economic situation is essential**. Ensuring dignified living through coexistence is crucial. Additionally, increasing patriotism and love for Lebanon are important. These and other necessary drivers are reflected in the chart below.

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
Chart 36: The drivers of commonalities and sense of unity promoters in Lebanon without diminishing diversity according to the youth (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

SOCIAL COHESION

The surveyed youth reflect the reality of Lebanon as a small country with a diverse mix of 18 religious sects, multiple political parties, and various migrant worker and refugee nationalities, all living in close proximity. This is shown by 70% of respondents who **interact daily with individuals from different national, political, and religious backgrounds**, as reflected in below chart.

Chart 37: Frequency of youth interacting with members of society who have different national, political or religious/ belief backgrounds (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Nearly half of the sample interact with people from different backgrounds at school, university, or workplace, and within their social circles as close friends or acquaintances. One third interact with them at the market, or within their building and neighborhood. This is reflected in the charts below.

Chart 38: Placed the youth usually encounter people from different national, political or religious/belief backgrounds at (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

COMFORT LEVEL WHEN INTERACTING WITH PEOPLE FROM DIFFERENT BACKGROUNDS

Youth display high comfort levels in diverse interactions. The charts below illustrate this openness. A nuanced pattern emerges in their preferences. Religious diversity appears most easily navigated. Interactions across nationalities present a slightly higher barrier. Political differences prove the most challenging. This distinction is also reflected in the charts below.

Palestinian youth consistently show the highest comfort levels across all categories, with 70% very comfortable interacting with different nationalities and 68% with different religions. Syrian youth demonstrate consistent comfort levels across all categories.

Among Lebanese youth, there's a significant decrease in those feeling "very comfortable" with different nationalities (from 61% to 39%) and religions (from 77% to 55%) between baseline and endline surveys.

Among religious sects, Druze and Armenian sects maintain high comfort levels, particularly with religious diversity (63% and 69% very comfortable, respectively). Catholics show the lowest comfort with different nationalities (22% very comfortable). Shia youth exhibit the most significant decrease in comfort with different nationalities (from 71% to 35% very comfortable).

Interestingly, comfort with different political backgrounds remains relatively stable across most groups, with Armenians showing a notable increase (from 58% to 70% very comfortable) as reflected in the below tables. These trends suggest a complex interplay of factors influencing intercommunal comfort levels, with some groups becoming more open while others show signs of increased wariness, particularly regarding national differences.

Chart 39: The youth's comfort level when interacting with people from a different nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	Armenian	Syrian	Palestinian
Endline	**Very comfortable**	39%	38%	42%	70%
	Somewhat comfortable	40%	29%	37%	25%
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	7%	8%	9%	2%
	Somewhat uncomfortable	12%	25%	11%	2%
	Very uncomfortable / I try to avoid as much as possible	2%	-	1%	-
Baseline	**Very comfortable**	61%	62%	51%	61%
	Somewhat comfortable	28%	25%	24%	30%
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	5%	12%	11%	4%
	Somewhat uncomfortable	4%	-	9%	5%
	Very uncomfortable / I try to avoid as much as possible	1%	-	5%	-

Table 39: The youth's comfort level when interacting with people from a different nationality, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	Shia	Maronite	Orthodox	Druze	Catholic	Armenian	Other religious group (Minorities)	Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)
Endline	**Very comfortable**	45%	35%	32%	41%	40%	22%	67%	38%	100%
	Somewhat comfortable	37%	36%	52%	36%	43%	41%	15%	38%	-
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	8%	10%	6%	4%	8%	8%	6%	-	-
	Somewhat uncomfortable	10%	17%	9%	16%	8%	25%	12%	25%	-
	Very uncomfortable / I try to avoid as much as possible	1%	2%	3%	3%	2%	4%	-	-	-

	Very comfortable	54%	71%	66%	53%	56%	41%	60%	88%	-
	Somewhat comfortable	28%	21%	24%	29%	35%	41%	33%	6%	100%
Baseline	**Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable**	8%	3%	3%	12%	6%	13%	2%	6%	-
	Somewhat uncomfortable	7%	4%	5%	6%	2%	6%	4%	-	-
	Very uncomfortable / I try to avoid as much as possible	3%	1%	2%	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 40: The youth's comfort level when interacting with people from a different nationality, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Chart 40: The youth's comfort level when interacting with people from a different religion (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	**Armenian**	**Syrian**	**Palestinian**
Endline	**Very comfortable**	55%	50%	47%	68%
	Somewhat comfortable	39%	29%	36%	25%
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	4%	8%	6%	2%
	Somewhat uncomfortable	2%	12%	10%	5%
	Very uncomfortable / I try to avoid as much as possible	*	-	1%	-
Baseline	**Very comfortable**	77%	88%	58%	59%
	Somewhat comfortable	18%	12%	19%	30%
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	3%	-	13%	5%
	Somewhat uncomfortable	2%	-	6%	5%
	Very uncomfortable / I try to avoid as much as possible	*	-	4%	1%

Table 41: The youth's comfort level when interacting with people from a different religion, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

	Religious sect							
	Sunni	**Shia**	**Maronite**	**Orthodox**	**Druze**	**Catholic**	**Armenian**	**Other religious group (Minorities)**	**Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)**

Endline	Very comfortable	<u>51%</u>	<u>59%</u>	<u>46%</u>	<u>49%</u>	<u>63%</u>	<u>45%</u>	<u>69%</u>	<u>88%</u>	<u>100%</u>
	Somewhat comfortable	<u>36%</u>	<u>34%</u>	<u>47%</u>	<u>44%</u>	<u>34%</u>	<u>51%</u>	<u>19%</u>	<u>12%</u>	-
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	5%	3%	5%	3%	3%	-	7%	-	-
	Somewhat uncomfortable	7%	4%	1%	4%	-	2%	4%	-	-
	Very uncomfortable / I try to avoid as much as possible	1%	-	1%	-	-	2%	-	-	-
Baseline	Very comfortable	65%	85%	78%	67%	94%	46%	67%	88%	-
	Somewhat comfortable	20%	13%	17%	24%	5%	37%	27%	6%	100%
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	8%	1%	3%	6%	2%	11%	7%	6%	-
	Somewhat uncomfortable	5%	1%	2%	1%	-	6%	-	-	-
	Very uncomfortable / I try to avoid as much as possible	2%	-	-	1%	-	-	-	-	-

Table 42: The youth's comfort level when interacting with people from a different religion, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Chart 41: The youth's comfort level when interacting with people from a different political background (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	**Armenian**	**Syrian**	**Palestinian**
Endline	Very comfortable	<u>45%</u>	<u>46%</u>	<u>46%</u>	<u>62%</u>
	Somewhat comfortable	<u>40%</u>	<u>25%</u>	<u>31%</u>	<u>28%</u>
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	10%	8%	9%	2%
	Somewhat uncomfortable	4%	21%	12%	8%
	Very uncomfortable / I try to avoid as much as possible	1%	-	2%	-
Baseline	Very comfortable	59%	88%	57%	54%
	Somewhat comfortable	25%	-	19%	35%
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	9%	-	16%	8%
	Somewhat uncomfortable	5%	-	6%	4%

	Very uncomfortable / I try to avoid as much as possible	2%	12%	3%	-

Table 43: The youth's comfort level when interacting with people from a different political background, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	**Shia**	**Maronite**	**Orthodox**	**Druze**	**Catholic**	**Armenian**	**Other religious group (Minorities)**	**Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)**
Endline	**Very comfortable**	47%	46%	36%	49%	40%	39%	70%	38%	100%
	Somewhat comfortable	34%	32%	49%	41%	46%	55%	16%	38%	-
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	9%	13%	11%	4%	12%	4%	6%	25%	-
	Somewhat uncomfortable	9%	8%	2%	4%	2%	-	7%	-	-
	Very uncomfortable / I try to avoid as much as possible	2%	*	1%	1%	-	2%	-	-	-
Baseline	**Very comfortable**	54%	69%	70%	54%	45%	41%	58%	81%	-
	Somewhat comfortable	25%	17%	20%	29%	31%	39%	24%	6%	100%
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	12%	5%	6%	10%	18%	17%	11%	6%	-
	Somewhat uncomfortable	6%	6%	3%	4%	5%	4%	7%	6%	-
	Very uncomfortable / I try to avoid as much as possible	3%	3%	1%	3%	2%	-	-	-	-

Table 44: The youth's comfort level when interacting with people from a different political background, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

SEEKING PEOPLE IN AUTHORITY WHEN TRYING TO SOLVE AN ISSUE OF PUBLIC CONCERN

Most surveyed youth (52%) **tackle public concerns alone**. The chart below illustrates this striking trend. This tendency reflects Lebanon's unique culture. Many teenagers and young adults haven't yet encountered public issues. Those who have often rely on parental guidance. The data suggests a complex interplay of independence and familial support. It paints a picture of youth at a crossroads, navigating between self-reliance and traditional family structures.

Among religious sects, Druze and Catholic youth showed the highest tendency towards self-reliance (60% and 61% respectively). Notably, Armenian youth demonstrated the most significant shift, with those not turning to anyone increasing from 11% to 34%. The "Other religious group (Minorities)" category stands out for maintaining a preference for seeking help from authority figures regardless of background (62% in the endline survey).

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
Chart 42: People in authority the youth most likely turn to when trying to solve an issue of public concern (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	Armenian	Syrian	Palestinian
Endline	A person in authority who is a member of your own group (religious, political, social)	17%	33%	14%	15%
	A person in authority regardless of their background or belonging	34%	8%	28%	35%
	I don't turn to anyone	50%	58%	58%	50%
Baseline	A person in authority who is a member of your own group (religious, political, social)	12%	25%	15%	16%
	A person in authority regardless of their background or belonging	68%	50%	44%	54%
	No Answer	20%	25%	41%	30%

Table 45: People in authority the youth most likely turn to when trying to solve an issue of public concern, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	Shia	Maronite	Orthodox	Druze	Catholic	Armenian	Other religious group (Minorities)	Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)
Endline	A person in authority who is a member of your own group (religious, political, social)	16%	21%	10%	19%	17%	16%	16%	-	-
	A person in authority regardless of their background or belonging	31%	33%	32%	27%	23%	24%	49%	62%	-
	I don't turn to anyone	53%	46%	58%	53%	60%	61%	34%	38%	100%
Baseline	A person in authority who is a member of your own group (religious, political, social)	13%	19%	7%	21%	21%	11%	11%	6%	-
	A person in authority regardless of their background or belonging	55%	54%	79%	65%	58%	78%	78%	81%	100%
	No Answer	33%	27%	14%	14%	21%	11%	11%	12%	-

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Table 46: People in authority the youth most likely turn to when trying to solve an issue of public concern, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

SEEKING ASSISTANCE FROM AUTHORITY PEOPLE EXPLAINED

Youth seeking aid exhibit varied preferences. A notable 16% turn to authority figures within their own group, **believing they'll provide genuine help**. This sentiment is clearly illustrated in the chart.

Chart 43: Reasons provided by the youth for seeking assistance from people in authority from their own group (Baseline N=145, Endline N=206)

In contrast, 32% would approach authority figures regardless of background. **Their primary concern is problem-solving, not cultural affiliation**. They prioritize resolving their issues over any group distinctions. The chart below vividly captures this pragmatic approach.

Chart 44: Reasons provided by the youth for seeking assistance from people in authority regardless of their background (Baseline N=778, Endline N=402)

SEEKING ASSISTANCE FROM PEOPLE SUFFERING FROM SAME PUBLIC CONCERN, AWAY FROM AUTHORITY

Youth rarely seek help from peers facing similar issues. This holds true regardless of shared or differing backgrounds. The charts below clearly illustrate this trend.

Young adults surveyed show little preference for their helpers' identity. Their primary focus is on resolving their public concerns. They prioritize effective assistance over the source's background. This pragmatic approach reveals a generation focused on solutions. It suggests a shift away from traditional community-based support systems. Instead, youth appear to value competence and results above all.

There is a notable trend towards self-reliance among Lebanese youth when addressing public concerns, with significant variations across nationalities and sects. Palestinian youth show the highest reluctance to seek help from those with similar backgrounds, with 68% rarely doing so in the endline survey, up from 41% in the baseline. Armenian youth display the most significant shift towards seeking **exclusive help** from their own community, increasing from 0% to 25%. Among religious sects, Maronites and Orthodox Christians show the highest tendency to rarely seek help from their own community (73% and 74% respectively). Interestingly, when it comes to seeking help from those with different backgrounds, Armenian youth show a stark contrast, with 42% exclusively doing so, the highest among all groups. Druze youth demonstrate the most significant increase in rarely seeking help from different backgrounds, rising from 21% to 60%.

Chart 45: Youth seeking assistance, when trying to solve an issue of public concern, from people from their community who have the same background and suffer from the same public concern, away from authority (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	**Armenian**	**Syrian**	**Palestinian**
Endline	rarely	62%	54%	59%	68%
	occasionally	12%	8%	10%	15%
	mostly	18%	12%	24%	15%
	exclusively	8%	25%	7%	2%
Baseline	rarely	53%	38%	53%	41%
	occasionally	27%	38%	19%	40%
	mostly	15%	25%	25%	19%
	exclusively	4%	-	3%	-

Table 47: Youth seeking assistance, when trying to solve an issue of public concern, from people from their community who have the same background and suffer from the same public concern, away from authority, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	**Shia**	**Maronite**	**Orthodox**	**Druze**	**Catholic**	**Armenian**	**Other religious group (Minorities)**	**Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)**
Endline	rarely	58%	51%	73%	74%	55%	63%	78%	50%	100%
	occasionally	11%	16%	12%	8%	15%	8%	3%	25%	-
	mostly	23%	25%	11%	7%	23%	20%	7%	25%	-
	exclusively	8%	8%	4%	11%	6%	10%	12%	-	-
Baseline	rarely	47%	53%	68%	55%	32%	67%	51%	75%	-
	occasionally	28%	25%	18%	21%	50%	19%	20%	19%	100%
	mostly	22%	17%	12%	15%	15%	13%	22%	6%	-
	exclusively	3%	5%	3%	9%	3%	2%	7%	-	-

Table 48: Youth seeking assistance, when trying to solve an issue of public concern, from people from their community who have the same background and suffer from the same public concern, away from authority, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Chart 46: Youth seeking assistance, when trying to solve an issue of public concern, from people from their community who come from a different background and suffer from the same public concern, away from authority (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	Armenian	Syrian	Palestinian
Endline	rarely	48%	42%	34%	50%
	occasionally	22%	17%	22%	22%
	mostly	14%	-	27%	28%
	exclusively	15%	42%	17%	-
Baseline	rarely	41%	25%	33%	39%
	occasionally	26%	38%	18%	14%
	mostly	26%	-	39%	28%
	exclusively	7%	38%	10%	20%

Table 49: Youth seeking assistance, when trying to solve an issue of public concern, from people from their community who come from a different background and suffer from the same public concern, away from authority, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	Shia	Maronite	Orthodox	Druze	Catholic	Armenian	Other religious group (Minorities)	Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)
Endline	rarely	37%	50%	53%	55%	60%	59%	28%	12%	100%
	occasionally	25%	27%	15%	10%	35%	14%	6%	38%	-
	mostly	26%	19%	8%	7%	-	16%	1%	50%	-
	exclusively	12%	4%	24%	29%	5%	12%	64%	-	-
Baseline	rarely	30%	43%	55%	49%	21%	57%	38%	56%	-

|	occasionally	24%	27%	18%	15%	48%	17%	13%	12%	100%
	mostly	35%	22%	23%	27%	19%	24%	33%	19%	-
	exclusively	11%	7%	4%	9%	11%	2%	16%	12%	-

Table 50: Youth seeking assistance, when trying to solve an issue of public concern, from people from their community who come from a different background and suffer from the same public concern, away from authority, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

NGOs in Lebanon garner mixed reviews from youth. The majority view their work as beneficial to society. This positive sentiment is notable. Palestinian youth show the highest approval of NGO work (68%), while Lebanese youth are more skeptical (58% approval). Among religious sects, Druze youth express the most positive view of NGOs (69% approval). Yet, a significant minority holds a contrary opinion. They see no societal benefit in NGO activities. Among religious sects, Non-religious and Catholics are the most critical (100% and 57% disapproval respectively),. **This divide is striking and worth attention.**

The chart and tables below vividly illustrate this split in perception. It reveals a nuanced landscape of youth attitudes towards NGOs. This divergence suggests a complex relationship between NGOs and Lebanese society. It hints at potential areas for improvement in NGO operations or communication.

Chart 47: The youth opinion regarding whether NGO's work benefit to society or not (Endline N=1268)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	Armenian	Syrian	Palestinian
Endline	**Yes**	58%	62%	63%	68%
	No	37%	38%	28%	32%
	Don't know	5%	-	8%	-

Table 51: The youth opinion regarding whether NGO's work benefit to society or not, breakdown by Nationality (Endline N=1268)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	Shia	Maronite	Orthodox	Druze	Catholic	Armenian	Other religious group (Minorities)	Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)
Endline	**Yes**	66%	47%	57%	56%	69%	41%	63%	75%	-
	No	28%	45%	39%	40%	26%	57%	31%	25%	100%

Refused	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Don't know	6%	8%	4%	4%	5%	2%	6%	-	-

Table 52: The youth opinion regarding whether NGO's work benefit to society or not, breakdown by Sect (Endline N=1268)

Youth engagement in civic matters appears strikingly low. An overwhelming 80% of surveyed youth report no participation in awareness-raising or civic advancement activities. This stark statistic paints a clear picture. The vast majority of young people are not actively involved in their communities' civic life. However, there's a striking increase in participation among Syrian and Palestinian youth (from 2% to 25% and 8% to 25% respectively) between baseline and endline surveys. Conversely, Armenian youth show a significant decrease in engagement (from 25% to 4%). Among sects, Shia youth demonstrate the highest civic participation (29%), while Orthodox Christians show the lowest (5%). Notably, Christians overall, particularly Catholics and Orthodox, show the highest rates of civic inactivity (96% and 93% respectively).

The chart below visually emphasizes this significant disengagement. It offers a stark representation of youth apathy towards civic participation.

Chart 48: Youth self-perception as individuals that actively raises social awareness or participates in advancing civic matters (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	**Armenian**	**Syrian**	**Palestinian**
Endline	**Yes**	16%	4%	25%	25%
	No	82%	96%	73%	75%
	Refused	-	-	-	-
	Don't know	2%	-	2%	-
Baseline	**Yes**	13%	25%	2%	8%
	No	81%	38%	64%	80%
	Refused	1%	-	9%	1%

| | | | | Don't know | 6% | 38% | 25% | 11% | |

Table 53: Youth self-perception as individuals that actively raises social awareness or participates in advancing civic matters, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	Shia	Maronite	Orthodox	Druze	Catholic	Armenian	Other religious group (Minorities)	Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)
Endline	**Yes**	22%	29%	9%	5%	22%	4%	6%	38%	-
	No	76%	70%	88%	93%	78%	96%	90%	62%	100%
	Refused	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Don't know	1%	1%	3%	1%	-	-	4%	-	-
Baseline	**Yes**	9%	15%	8%	12%	13%	7%	7%	-	-
	No	70%	77%	85%	79%	84%	93%	87%	100%	100%
	Refused	5%	1%	1%	-	2%	-	-	-	-
	Don't know	16%	7%	6%	9%	2%	-	7%	-	-

Table 54: Youth self-perception as individuals that actively raises social awareness or participates in advancing civic matters, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Youth cite two primary reasons for their civic disengagement. **Lack of time** emerges as the leading factor. The second most common reason is more nuanced. Many youths **struggle to find suitable organizations or frameworks for raising social awareness**. The difficulty in finding appropriate platforms suggests a gap in the civic landscape. It indicates a potential mismatch between existing organizations and youth interests.

The chart below visually represents these findings. It offers a clear breakdown of the obstacles to youth civic participation.

Chart 49: The reasons the youth mentioned for being inactive in raising social awareness or advancing civic causes (Baseline N=974, Endline N=1009)

CHALLENGES FACED BY ACTIVE YOUTH

Three key challenges hinder youth civic engagement. **Financial constraints** top the list.

Finding suitable organizations for social awareness initiatives is the second hurdle. This suggests a gap between youth interests and available platforms.

Lack of time rounds out the trio of main obstacles. It reflects the competing demands on young people's lives.

These challenges paint a complex picture of youth civic participation. They highlight both personal and systemic barriers, as reflected in below chart.

Chart 50: Challenges faced by the youth when actively raising social awareness and advancing civic causes (Baseline N=125, Endline N=238)

SOCIAL ISSUES OF INTEREST FOR ACTIVE YOUTH

Human rights emerge as the primary focus for socially active youth. It captures 35% of their interest in awareness-raising efforts. **Children's rights** and **aiding the needy** share the second spot. Each garners 24% of youth attention. This distribution reveals a strong humanitarian focus among engaged youth. It suggests a keen awareness of societal inequalities and vulnerabilities.

Chart 51: Issues the active youth raise social awareness or civic causes they participate in advancing (Baseline N=125, Endline N=238)

Refugee rights capture significant attention among youth, albeit unevenly. Overall, 18% of engaged youth focus on this issue. A stark contrast emerges when examining this interest by nationality. **Syrian youth show a strong commitment, with 45% prioritizing refugee rights. In contrast, only 2% of Lebanese youth express interest in this area**. This disparity is striking and noteworthy.

MEANS OF WORKING TOWARDS ASPIRED CHANGE

Youth civic engagement primarily occurs within intimate circles. An overwhelming 93% **raise awareness among family and close friends**. Broader involvement is also significant. Religious groups and institutions attract 65% of engaged youth. Community groups closely follow, engaging 63% of these young activists. NGOs round out the top tier, with 62% of youth participating in their activities. This pattern reveals a multi-layered approach to civic engagement. Youth start with personal connections, then expand to established organizations.

Chart 52: Means of working towards aspired change used by the youth (Baseline N=125, Endline N=238)

INTEREST LEVEL IN JOINING A MIXED GROUP THAT TAKES INITIATIVE TO SOLVE SOCIAL ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE ACTIVE YOUTH

The youth surveyed reported a **high level of interest in joining mixed groups that take initiatives** in order to solve the social issues that concern them, as reflected in below chart.

The survey reveals a generally high interest among Lebanese youth in joining mixed groups to address social issues. Syrian and Palestinian youth maintain consistently high interest levels across both surveys. Among religious sects, Orthodox Christians stand out with 100% extreme interest in the endline survey, a significant increase from the baseline. Shia youth, however, show a marked decrease in extreme interest (from 58% to 15%), with a shift towards being somewhat interested. Druze youth also show a notable decrease in extreme interest (from 75% to 36%). Sunni youth maintain relatively consistent high interest levels across both surveys. Catholics display the highest level of disinterest (50% somewhat disinterested) in the endline survey.

Chart 53: Active youth interest level in participating in a mixed group that take initiatives to solve a social issue that the youth are concerned about (Baseline N=125, Endline N=238)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	Armenian	Syrian	Palestinian
Endline	**Interested Extremely**	40%	<u>100%</u>	45%	50%
	Somewhat interested	45%	-	43%	50%
	Neither interested nor disinterested	5%	-	2%	-
	Somewhat disinterested	9%	-	10%	-
	Extremely disinterested	1%	-	-	-
Baseline	**Interested Extremely**	52%	-	67%	50%
	Somewhat interested	36%	100%	17%	33%
	Neither interested nor disinterested	5%	-	-	-
	Somewhat disinterested	4%	-	17%	17%
	Extremely disinterested	3%	-	-	-

Table 55: Active youth interest level in participating in a mixed group that take initiatives to solve a social issue that the youth are concerned about, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=125, Endline N=238)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	Shia	Maronite	Orthodox	Druze	Catholic	Armenian	Other religious group (Minorities)	Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)
Endline	**Interested Extremely**	53%	15%	29%	<u>100%</u>	36%	50%	<u>100%</u>	67%	-
	Somewhat interested	38%	61%	53%	-	57%	-	-	33%	-
	Neither interested nor disinterested	2%	7%	12%	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Somewhat disinterested	7%	15%	6%	-	7%	50%	-	-	-
	Extremely disinterested	-	3%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Baseline	**Interested Extremely**	56%	58%	31%	56%	75%	25%	-	-	-
	Somewhat interested	31%	24%	69%	33%	12%	75%	100%	-	-

|									
Neither interested nor disinterested	4%	9%	-	-	12%	-	-	-	-
Somewhat disinterested	8%	6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Extremely disinterested	2%	3%	-	11%	-	-	-	-	-

Table 56: Active youth interest level in participating in a mixed group that take initiatives to solve a social issue that the youth are concerned about, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=125, Endline N=238)

MEDIA USERSHIP

TYPES OF MEDIA USED AND PURPOSES

Socializing and entertainment, seem to be the two main purposes of media for the youth, with the Lebanese and Armenians mainly using it for entertainment and the Syrians and Palestinians mainly using it for socializing.

Among religious sects, Catholics show the highest use for entertainment (88%), while Armenians show the lowest (34%). Interestingly, Armenian youth report the highest rate of not using media at all (60%), a stark contrast to their baseline. Political news consumption decreased across most groups, with Maronites maintaining the highest interest (47%). Religious program viewership remains low overall but is highest among Palestinians (22%) and Sunnis (16%), as reflected in below chart and tables.

Chart 54: The purpose youth use media for (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	Armenian	Syrian	Palestinian
Endline	**Entertainment (movies, series, sports …)**	63%	71%	43%	48%
	Documentaries	15%	29%	13%	20%
	Political news or programs	35%	38%	21%	40%
	Religious programs / prayers	7%	4%	15%	22%
	Socializing with friends / family	60%	62%	64%	88%
	I do not view / use media	16%	12%	16%	8%
Baseline	**Entertainment (movies, series, sports …)**	83%	62%	72%	68%
	Documentaries	21%	25%	35%	8%
	Political news or programs	36%	38%	51%	52%
	Religious programs / prayers	6%	-	8%	6%

Socializing with friends / family	84%	62%	47%	51%

Table 57: The purpose youth use media for, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	Shia	Maronite	Orthodox	Druze	Catholic	Armenian	Other religious group (Minorities)	Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)
Endline	Entertainment (movies, series, sports …)	48%	69%	66%	66%	60%	<u>88%</u>	34%	<u>88%</u>	100%
	Documentaries	16%	17%	10%	10%	8%	35%	13%	62%	-
	Political news or programs	26%	32%	47%	36%	32%	43%	18%	12%	-
	Religious programs / prayers	16%	7%	1%	4%	2%	10%	1%	25%	-
	Socializing with friends / family	70%	51%	58%	59%	62%	73%	30%	75%	100%
	I do not view / use media	13%	10%	19%	26%	9%	-	60%	-	-
Baseline	Entertainment (movies, series, sports …)	73%	84%	88%	86%	92%	78%	80%	69%	100%
	Documentaries	26%	19%	22%	27%	26%	13%	29%	12%	-
	Political news or programs	48%	38%	27%	40%	48%	30%	33%	12%	-
	Religious programs / prayers	8%	7%	3%	4%	2%	4%	9%	6%	-
	Socializing with friends / family	62%	77%	90%	73%	92%	78%	89%	94%	100%

Table 58: The purpose youth use media for, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1268)

Below chart reflects the dominance of **social media** against all other types of media among the youth for all types of uses as reflected in below chart.


Chart 55: Youth's different types of media usership (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1068)

MEDIA SOURCES TRUSTED THE MOST AND REASONS

There is a significant shift in youth attitudes towards Lebanese media, with overall trust levels increasing from the baseline to the endline survey. Syrian and Armenian youth show the

highest levels of trust, with 67% and 49% respectively either fully or somewhat trusting Lebanese media in the endline survey. This contrasts sharply with Lebanese youth, who remain more skeptical, with 53% somewhat or fully distrusting media. Among religious sects, Sunnis show the highest trust (55% fully or somewhat trust), while Orthodox Christians and Druze show the lowest (48% and 58% respectively somewhat or fully distrust).


Chart 56: Youth's trust level in Lebanese media (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1068)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	**Armenian**	**Syrian**	**Palestinian**
Endline	**Fully trust**	5%	38%	21%	5%
	Somewhat Trust	29%	19%	46%	38%
	Neither trust nor distrust	14%	5%	13%	16%
	Somewhat do not trust	31%	19%	12%	22%
	Do not trust at all	22%	19%	9%	19%
Baseline	**Fully trust**	1%	-	9%	-
	Somewhat Trust	13%	-	8%	10%
	Neither trust nor distrust	9%	25%	15%	24%
	Somewhat do not trust	23%	38%	22%	26%
	Do not trust at all	53%	38%	46%	40%

Table 59: Youth's trust level in Lebanese media, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1068)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	**Shia**	**Maronite**	**Orthodox**	**Druze**	**Catholic**	**Armenian**	**Other religious group (Minorities)**	**Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)**
Endline	**Fully trust**	15%	1%	4%	7%	-	8%	30%	-	-
	Somewhat Trust	40%	27%	30%	28%	34%	22%	19%	-	-
	Neither trust nor distrust	13%	19%	11%	7%	8%	12%	7%	25%	-
	Somewhat do not trust	16%	25%	41%	41%	46%	35%	22%	38%	-

	Do not trust at all	16%	27%	14%	17%	12%	24%	22%	38%	100%
Baseline	**Fully trust**	5%	1%	1%	-	2%	-	2%	-	-
	Somewhat Trust	11%	12%	11%	12%	16%	11%	9%	12%	-
	Neither trust nor distrust	14%	9%	9%	9%	8%	20%	7%	-	-
	Somewhat do not trust	24%	20%	19%	28%	16%	31%	33%	19%	100%
	Do not trust at all	45%	57%	60%	51%	58%	37%	49%	69%	-

Table 60: Youth's trust level in Lebanese media, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1068)

A notable trend is the increased trust in independent media across all groups, with Syrians (79%) and Sunnis (72%) showing the highest preference for independent sources in the endline survey. However, a significant minority, particularly among Lebanese (39%), Catholics (53%), and Orthodox Christians (50%), report not trusting media at all..


Chart 57: Kind of media sources the youth trust more than the other (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1068)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	**Armenian**	**Syrian**	**Palestinian**
Endline	**Media sources run by people from same background as mine only**	8%	-	8%	11%
	Independent Media only	53%	71%	79%	65%
	I do not trust the media at all	39%	29%	13%	24%
Baseline	**Media sources run by people from same background as mine only**	2%	-	8%	9%
	Independent Media only	36%	38%	26%	40%
	I do not trust the media at all	62%	62%	66%	51%

Table 61: Kind of media sources the youth trust more than the other, breakdown by Nationality (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1068)

	Religious sect								
		Sunni	**Shia**	**Maronite**	**Orthodox**	**Druze**	**Catholic**	**Armenian**	**Other religious group (Minorities)**	**Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)**

Endline	Media sources run by people from same background as mine only	8%	12%	7%	7%	3%	-	-	-	-
	Independent Media only	<u>72%</u>	53%	47%	43%	66%	47%	59%	50%	-
	I do not trust the media at all	20%	35%	46%	50%	31%	53%	41%	50%	100%
Baseline	Media sources run by people from same background as mine only	6%	6%	1%	3%	-	-	-	-	-
	Independent Media only	35%	25%	32%	31%	40%	57%	38%	19%	100%
	I do not trust the media at all	59%	69%	68%	67%	60%	43%	62%	81%	-

Table 62: Kind of media sources the youth trust more than the other, breakdown by Sect (Baseline N=1271, Endline N=1068)

The reasons reported by the youth who trust independent media are, for it being **credible, objective and transparent**, and bring free from influence, as reflected in below chart.


Chart 58: The reasons behind the youth trusting independent media only (Baseline N=429, Endline N=654)

As for why they did not trust media in general, it is mainly because the media is **politicized and lacks credibility**, as reflected in below chart.

*Chart 59: The reasons behind the youth not trusting media at all (Baseline N=791, Endline N=332)*

SAT-7: LEBANON OUR STORY

SAT-7 AWERNESS

SAT-7 has limited recognition among surveyed youth. Only 5% report familiarity with the name. Lebanese youth show the highest awareness at 6%, while Palestinian youth have the lowest at 2%. Among religious sects, Catholics and Orthodox Christians demonstrate significantly higher awareness (16% and 14% respectively) compared to other groups, particularly Sunni and Shia Muslims (both at 3%).

Among those aware of SAT-7, perceptions vary:

- 61% identify it as a religious channel

- 34% view it simply as a TV channel

- 17% recognize it as a website

Viewership among those familiar with SAT-7 is notable. 39% of aware youth report watching the channel.

These findings reveal a niche but engaged audience. They suggest SAT-7's diverse media presence, spanning television and online platforms.

The charts and tables below visually represent these data points. They offer a clear breakdown of SAT-7's recognition and perception among youth.

Chart 60: Youth knowledge of SAT-7 (Endline N=1268)

		Nationality			
		Lebanese	**Armenian**	**Syrian**	**Palestinian**
Endline	**Yes**	6%	8%	4%	2%
	No	94%	92%	96%	98%

Table 63: Youth knowledge of SAT-7, breakdown by Nationality (Endline N=1268)

		Religious sect								
		Sunni	**Shia**	**Maronite**	**Orthodox**	**Druze**	**Catholic**	**Armenian**	**Other religious group (Minorities)**	**Other non-religious beliefs (Secular / Atheist/ agnostic)**
Endline	**Yes**	3%	3%	8%	14%	2%	16%	3%	12%	-
	No	97%	97%	92%	86%	98%	84%	97%	88%	100%

Table 64: Youth knowledge of SAT-7, breakdown by Sect (Endline N=1268)


Chart 61: Youth awareness of what SAT-7 is (Endline N=64)


Chart 62: Youth viewership of SAT-7 (Endline N=64)

Interestingly, awareness of SAT-7 Academy is extremely low, with only 1% of respondents knowing about it and understanding its purpose, as reflected in below chart.

Chart 63: Youth knowledge of SAT-7 Academy (Endline N=1268)

LEBANON OUR STORY DOCUMENTARIES VIEWERSHIP AND INSPIRATION

The assessment reveals limited exposure to LOS documentaries among surveyed youth. Only 1% reported watching at least one. Viewing platforms varied:

- 45% watched on Facebook
- 36% viewed on SAT-7 Arabic channel
- 18% couldn't recall the platform

The charts below visually represent these data points, offering a clear breakdown of viewership and impact.

1%

92%

■ Yes ■ No

*Chart 64: Short documentaries viewership (Endline N=1268)*

Chart 65: The media channels the youth watched the short documentaries though (Endline N=11)

When prompted, 45% remembered a specific documentary regarding a **"Syrian girl who faced discrimination in Lebanon"**, the highest recall rate, as reflected in the below chart.

Chart 66: short documentaries watched by the youth (Endline N=11)

The primary lessons learned by youth were **humanity** (55%) and **compassion** (55%). They were inspired to embrace and accept others who are different, as shown in the charts below.


*Chart 67: Lessons learned from watching the documentaries (Endline N=11)*

Chart 68: The short documentaries inspired the youth to open and accept people (Endline N=11)

Only 18% of youth were inspired to join a cross-community network after watching the short documentaries, as shown in the charts below.


Chart 69: The short documentary's ability to drive the youth to join a cross-community network (Endline N=11)

Chart 70: Cross-community network joined (Endline N=2)

The youth not engaged in cross-community networks cited **lack of interest** as their primary reason, as shown in the chart below.

Chart 71: Reasons the documentaries did not drive the youth to joined a cross-community network (Endline N=9)

FOR YOUR EYES SERIES VIEWERSHIP AND INSPIRATION

Similarly, 1% of youth watched "For Her Eyes" series:

- 56% couldn't recall the viewing platform

- 33% mentioned SAT-7 Arabia

Chart 72: For your eyes series viewership (Endline N=1268)

Chart 73: The media channels the youth watched the series for your eyes though (Endline N=9)

However, the series had significant impacts:

- 67% learned about **humanity**

- 55% felt **inspired to accept those different from them**

Notably, it didn't drive youth to join cross-community networks, as reflected in the below charts.

Chart 74: Lessons learned from watching the series (Endline N=9)

Chart 75: the series inspired the youth to open and accept people (Endline N=9)

Chart 76: The series made the youth support more diversity between people of different faiths in Lebanon (Endline N=9)

Chart 77: The series' ability to drive the youth to join a cross-community network (Endline N=9)

The youth cited **lack of interest** as the main reason for not joining any cross-community network, as reflected in the below chart.

Chart 78: Reasons the series did not drive the youth to joined a cross-community network (Endline N=9)

Chart 79: Civic engagement initiatives joined by youth as a result of you watching the documentaries/series (Endline N=2)

SAT-7 ESTIMATED VIEWERSHIP BY POPULATION

According to the Population Reference Bureau, Lebanon's population is 5,400,000. Youth between 15 to 25 years of age make up 18.1% of this population, based on 2022 data from the Central Administration of Statistics in Lebanon. This translates to an estimated 977,400 youth in this age range. Of these, approximately 48,870 youth have heard of or know SAT-7. The SAT-7 audience among youth is estimated at 19,059. About 8,479 youth are familiar with SAT-7 Academy. The same number have watched one or more short documentaries from "Lebanon, Our Story". An estimated 6,937 youth have watched the series "For Your Eyes". The tables below provide a detailed breakdown of these estimates.

Demographic	Data
Percent Population 15 to 25	18.10%
Total Population	5,400,000
Total estimated population between 15-25	977,400

Table 65: Estimated population breakdown

	Endline result	Population estimates
SAT-7 awareness	5%	48,870
SAT-7 viewership	39%	19,059
SAT-7 Academy awareness	0.87%	8,479
Short documentaries viewership	0.87%	8,479
For Your Eyes series viewership	0.71%	6,937

Table 66: Estimated viewership based on population

CONCLUSION

Lebanon's youth face existential concerns amid multiple crises. They prioritize education, employment, and family protection, striving for personal and national economic stability.

Sectarianism, corruption, and favoritism are seen as major barriers to progress. Youth attribute these issues primarily to political leaders, while acknowledging public complicity in supporting divisive parties.

To overcome these challenges, they envision a peaceful, just country. Increasing awareness is viewed as key to dismantling sectarianism and corruption.

Despite strong religious ties, youth embrace diversity. They maintain hope for a unified Lebanon transcending religious and cultural differences.

However, active pursuit of these ideals is limited. Disillusioned by the 2019 revolution's perceived failure, many now vent frustrations on social media rather than through direct action.

Social media dominates youth communication, overshadowing traditional media. It appears to be the most effective channel for reaching and potentially influencing this demographic.

This complex landscape reveals a generation balancing hope and frustration, seeking stability while yearning for change, primarily through digital platforms.

LOS Indicators & Endline Means Of Verification

Indicator	Endline means of verification	Baseline	Endline
Objective: Young members (15-25) of various religious or belief, 2 groups in Lebanon, inclusive of displaced Syrians, Palestinians and Armenians, possess a shared narrative of hope that drives social cohesion and provides an impetus for meaningful civic engagement.			
Narrative of hope - % of respondents reporting hope and the promise of change in regard to cross-community relations.	CATI Survey – IV Aspirations/Hope Q20 - How hopeful are you when you think about relations improving between different groups in Lebanon (e.g. Muslims and Christians, Refugees and Host communities)?	**Q20a. Religious &non-religious groups:** Hopeful: 51% Not hopeful: 33% **Q20b. Host & Refugee communities:** Hopeful: 48% Not hopeful: 36% **Q20c. Different religious groups:** Hopeful: 63% Not hopeful: 24%	**Q20a. Religious & non-religious groups:** Hopeful: 67% Not hopeful: 27% **Q20b. Host & Refugee communities:** Hopeful: 53% Not hopeful: 39% **Q20c. Different religious groups:** Hopeful: 80% Not hopeful: 15%
Social cohesion - % of respondents that report interacting with members of society who have a different national, political religious or belief background on a daily basis (sharing goods and services	CATI Survey – III Social Cohesion Q6 - How often do you interact with members of society who have different national, political or religious/ belief backgrounds? (01 Daily)	**Daily:** 56%	**Daily:** 76%

LEBANON, OUR STORY – REPORT OF FINDINGS

like shops, schools, transport, neighbourhoods, etc).			
Civic engagement - % of respondents participating in the advancements of matters of shared public concern and the description of some of these matters and means of participation.	CATI Survey – Civic Engagement: Q23 - Would you describe yourself as someone who actively raises social awareness or participates in advancing civic matters? *(Unaided-Single Response)* Q24 – If you do raise social awareness or participate in advancing civic causes, what are some of the issues you are working to change? *(Unaided-Multiple Response) and question 25*	**Q23:** • Yes: 10% (N = 125) • No: 77% • Do not know / Refuse: 14% **Q24 (N = 125)** Spontaneous • Human rights: 78% • Violence against women: 42% **Q25 (N = 125)** Answering YES to Aided question: • Public demonstrations: 46% • Organized demonstrations: 7% • Writing to politicians on social media: 33% • Within own social circle: 86% • Joining community groups: 46% • Volunteering with NGOs: 44% • Volunteering with religious groups: 32% • Volunteering with political	**Q23** • Yes: 19% (N = 238) • No: 80% • Do not know / Refuse: 2% **Q24 (N = 238)** Spontaneous • Human rights: 35% • Children's rights: 24% • Helping the needy: 24% • Women empowerment: 21% • Refugees: 18% **Q25 (N = 238)** Answering YES to Aided question: • Public demonstrations: 34% • Organized demonstrations: 22% • Writing to politicians on social media: 42% • Within own social circle: 93% • Joining community groups:

		party: 5%	63%
		Q27 (N = 125)-	• Volunteering with NGOs: 62%
		• Willingness to participate in a mixed group: 88% (extremely interested / somewhat interested)	• Volunteering with religious groups: 65%
			• Volunteering with political party: 12%
		• Extremely interested: 52%	**Q27 (N = 238)**
		• Somewhat interested: 36%	• Willingness to participate in a mixed group: 88% (extremely interested / somewhat interested)
			• Extremely interested: 42%
			• Somewhat interested: 44%

		Baseline	Endline
Outcome 1) Bridging – Young members (15-25) of various religious or belief groups within Lebanon, inclusive of displaced Syrians, Palestinians and Armenians, are more inclined to seek out and maintain connection with other demographic groups with whom they differ ethnically, socially, politically or religiously.			
% that have joined cross-community networks (online groups, community groups, unions, etc.), citing the intervention	Q43 – Did the documentaries LOS drive you to join a cross-community network; Like online groups (on Facebook for example),	**N/A**	**Q43 (N = 11)** Yes: 18% No: 82% **Q50 (N = 9)**

as a driving force for this decision)	community groups, and unions that encourage peaceful coexistence, and accepting others who are different? Q50 – Did the series "For your Eyes" drive you to join a cross-community network; Like online groups (on Facebook for example), community groups, and unions that encourage peaceful coexistence, and accepting others who are different?		Yes: 0% No: 100%
% that believe integration of religious communities/displace-host communities will have a negative effect of them and their family.	CATI Survey – IV Aspirations/Hope Q19 - Do you believe that a greater mixing of communities (for example religious and belief communities or host and refugee communities) within society would have a positive or negative effect on you and your family?	**Positive effect:** Religious & non-religious groups: 68% Host & refugee communities: 61% Different religious groups: 74%	**Positive effect**: Religious & non-religious groups: 77% Host & refugee communities: 61% Different religious groups: 90%

Outcome 2) Bonding – Young members (15-25) of various religious or belief groups within Lebanon, inclusive of displaced Syrians, Palestinians and Armenians, are more committed to kinship across ethnic, social, political or religious lines based upon national identity, common values or struggles and/or the shared use of goods and services, seeking to protect people rather than any given religion or belief.	Baseline	Endline
% that believe that a harmonious society is likely, very likely or certain.	Q18 - To what extent do you believe a society of, religious & non-religious groups, host & refugee communities, different religious groups, can live harmoniously together?	**Q18a. Religious & non-religious groups:** Certain: 7% Likely: 58% Unlikely: 29% **Q18b. Host & refugee communities:** Certain: 9% Likely: 55% Unlikely: 26% **Q18c. Different religious groups:** Certain: 17% Likely: 56% Unlikely: 21%	**Q18a. Religious & non-religious groups:** Certain: 5% Likely: 71% Unlikely: 18% **Q18b. Host & Refugee communities:** Certain: 2% Likely: 56% Unlikely: 32% **Q18c. Different religious groups:** Certain: 7% Likely: 80% Unlikely: 9%
% that believe that people from other sections of society should be encouraged to manifest their religion or belief.	Q16 - On the whole, would you encourage people from other religious or belief communities to openly practice their religion or belief? (e.g. prayer, worship, dress,	Yes: 83%	Yes: 91%

	consumption or absence from particular food and drinks, etc.)?		

Outcome 3) Building – Young members (15-25) of various religious or belief groups within Lebanon, inclusive of displaced Syrians, Palestinians and Armenians more readily engage with one another to (re)build Lebanese society by addressing issues of shared public concern.		Baseline	Endline
Description of civic engagement initiatives undertaken after intervention as a result of intervention.	Q44a – Please describe the cross-community network you joined, and why did the documentaries drive you to joined a cross-community network? Q51a – Please describe the cross-community network you joined, and why did the series drive you to joined a cross-community network?	**N/A**	**Q44a (N = 2)** Saving Children: 50% Facebook Group: 50% **Q51a (N = 0)** Not Applicable
% of respondents that seek assistance from members of their own group (religious, political, national) exclusively or mostly	CATI Survey – Social Cohesion Q9- When trying to solve an issue of public concern, who would you	**Q9** I don't turn to anyone: 52% A person in authority regardless of their background or belonging: 61%	**Q9** I don't turn to anyone: 52% A person in authority regardless of their background or belonging: 32%

when trying to solve an issue of public concern.	most likely turn to …? Q11a - When trying to solve an issue of public concern, away from authority, do you seek assistance People from your community who have the same background as you who suffer from the same public concern? Q11b - When trying to solve an issue of public concern, away from authority, do you seek assistance from People from your community who come from a different background than you but suffer from the same public concern?	A person in authority who is a member of your own group (religious, political, social): 11% **Q11** Exclusively a-People from my community of same background: 4% b- People from my community of different background: 9%	A person in authority who is a member of your own group (religious, political, social): 16% **Q11** Exclusively a-People from my community of same background: 8% b- People from my community of different background: 16%